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SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM:
ROBINSON V. CAHILL
JAMES A. MARTELL*
America has traditionally emphasized local responsibility for the
financing and administration of its public school systems.' Financing
public schools through property taxes at the local level, however,
creates serious inequality among districts in the educational resources
they are able to raise and distribute.2 State school financing systems
have thus come under strong attack in the past decade, either because
they fail to provide an adequate level of educational resources to all
districts or because they make the quality of a child's education a
function of the property wealth of his school district.3 Several school
* B.S., Colorado State University, 1972; J.D., Washington University, 1977.
1. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,741-42 (1974); San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 126 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see R. JOHNS & E.
MORPHET. THE ECONOMICS & FINANCING OF EDUCATION 200, 277 (3d ed. 1975); An-
dersen, School Finance in Washington-The Northshore Litigation and Beyond, 50
WASH. L. REV. 853, 896-97 (1975).
2. See J. BERKE, A. CAMPBELL & R. GOETTEL, FINANCING EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 5-16 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BERKE]. In New Jersey, property tax
resources vary from $1 million per pupil in the wealthiest district to $5,000 in the poorest.
The range is $100,000 to $30,000 when the 60 wealthiest and 60 poorest districts are
eliminated. Report of the Joint Education Committee to the New Jersey Legislature 19
(1974). See Berke & Sinkin, Developing a "Thorough and Efficient" School Finance
System: Alternatives for Implementing Robinson v. Cahill, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 337,343 Table
1 (1974) (expenditure levels vary in New Jersey from a high of $1647 per pupil to a low of
$717 per pupil); Silard & Goldstein, Toward Abolition of Local Funding in Public
Education, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 307, 311 & n.22 (1974); Tractenberg, Robinson v. Cahill: The
Thorough and Efficient Clause, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 312, 315 n.29 (1974).
3. See, e.g., J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION (1970); R. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN. REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE (1973);
S. SACKS, CITY SCHOOLS/SUBURBAN SCHOOLS (1972); A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS POOR
SCHOOLS (1968); Ruvoldt, Educational Financing in New Jersey: Robinson v. Cahill and
Beyond, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1973); Tractenberg, Reforming School Finance
Through State Constitutions: Robinson v. Cahill Points the Way, 27 RUTGERS L. REV.
365, 370-71 (1973). This Note will not consider whether school financing should in fact be
reformed. It has been argued that "equalizing" money could be better spent in other
areas like housing and employment. That argument is based on the premise that equaliz-
ing educational finances is an inefficient means of helping the powerless poor. Carring-
ton, Financing The American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
1227, 1250 (1973).
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finance systems have been challenged in the courts. 4 Other methods of
school finance have been proposed to meet such challenges and to
achieve equality of educational resources.5 State legislatures, how-
ever, have been reluctant to adopt such proposals without modifica-
tions substantially reducing their equalizing effect.6
Both the New Jersey and California courts have been deeply in-
volved in the school finance controversy for several years.7 In Sep-
4. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601 (1971); Horton v. Meskill, 31 Conn. Supp. 377, 332 A.2d 113 (Super. Ct. 1974);
Caldwell v. Kansas, No. 59616 (D. Kan. Aug. 30, 1973); Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I),
62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Sweetwater County
Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971).
5. See, e.g., COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 201-42 (district power
equalizing; discussed infra at notes 153-59); NEW YORK STATE COMM'N ON THE QUALITY,
COST AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., I THE FLEISHMANN
REPORT 60-87 (1973) (full state funding; discussed infra at notes 173-88) [hereinafter cited
as FLEISHMANN REPORT].
Family power equalizing (FPE) is a third alternative. See Coons & Sugarman, Family
Choice in Education: A Model State System for Vouchers, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 321 (1971).
FPE is an application of district power equalizing principles to educational vouchers.
Under the FPE proposal each family would be given a voucher based on the rate at
which the family chose to tax itself for education. The family could spend the voucher at
any school within the price range of its voucher. Id. at 334-335. The voucher system
promises maximum accountability and flexibility in the style and content of education
but may present problems of integration and state support for religious institutions. Id.
at 338-40.
Federal aid has also been suggested through an historical analysis of school financing.
Initially, the superiority of city schools led to state aid for rural systems. As suburban
school systems developed, the rural policies were extended to the suburbs. The city
school systems appeared deceptively stable during the period of suburban growth but in
fact were in a state of transition as poor minority children replaced the children of ethnic
groups who were transferring to parochial schools. Sacks argues that aid to rural and
suburban school systems should not be reduced to aid the inner cities. A pinpoint federal
program would provide aid to inner cities without affecting the present suburban-
oriented state programs. SACKS, supra note 3.
6. See Grubb, The First Round of Legislative Reforms in the Post-Serrano World, 38
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 459 (1974).
7. The New Jersey school finance litigation began with Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J.
Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (L. Div. 1972), in which the trial court held the state school
finance system to be unconstitutional and ordered that a nondiscriminatory school
finance system be enacted by January 1, 1973. The trial court refused to stay its order,
119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (L. Div. 1972). The New Jersey Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's holding in Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1), 62 N.J. 473, 303
A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). Subsequent litigation has involved im-
plementation of Robinson L In Robinson l the supreme court set December 31, 1974 as
the deadline for legislative action and retained jurisdiction for the 1975-76 school year. 63
N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973). The court later extended the deadline in Robinson III, 67
N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975), to the 1976-1977 school year. In Robinson IV the court
ordered the distribution of minimum support and save-harmless aid according to the
equalization scheme for the 1976-1977 school year. 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
Robinson V held the 1975 Act constitutional if fully funded. 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129
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tember, 1975, the New Jersey Legislature enacted a new school fi-
nance program8 which was approved by the New Jersey Supreme
Court,9 though it does not appear to achieve the equality hoped for by
many advocates of reform. California's school finance system is simi-
lar to that approved by the New Jersey court, but in December, 1976,
the California Supreme Court held that state's finance system uncon-
stitutional. 10 This Note will focus on the New Jersey litigation, which
may foreshadow some of the problems and pitfalls to be faced by
California courts and legislators in implementing a new school finance
system.
I. SCHOOL FINANCE UNDER ATTACK
States traditionally have financed their public school systems
through foundation programs and flat grants.'" Under a foundation
program, the state establishes a minimum grant per pupil and a
minimum tax rate at which districts must tax to obtain the foundation
aid. 12 Flat grants are a variation of foundation plans. 13 The state pro-
(1976). The state legislature had not enacted legislation to fund the 1975 Act by the spring
of 1976. In an attempt to implement the principles of Robinson I, the court in Robinson
VI enjoined the state from spending funds on the public schools unless the 1975 Act was
fully funded. 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976). The injunction in effect closed the public
school system in the state and prompted the state legislature to enact New Jersey's first
state income tax to fund the 1975 Act. New Jersey Gross Income Tax Act, ch. 47, 1976
N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 103 (West) (to be codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54A: 1-1 to 9-27).
The court dissolved the injunction in view of this legislation in Robinson VII. 70 N.J.
464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
The California school finance system was challenged in Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I),
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). The supreme court remanded the
case for trial. The trial court held the state school finance system unconstitutional,
Serrano v. Priest, No. 938,254 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 1974). The supreme court
affirmed in Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), - Cal. 3d -, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1976).
The Connecticut Supreme Court recently declared that state's school finance system
to be unconstitutional. The court did not suggest what type of finance system might
withstand constitutional attack and decided not to interfere with legislative attempts to
develop an equitable system. The court's hands-off approach may be an attempt to avoid
the judicial-legislative conflicts of the Robinson litigation. See Fellows, Connecticut
High Court Invalidates Property Tax For School Financing, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1977,
at 1, col. 1.
8. N.J. REV. STAT. § 18A: 7A-I to 7A-33 (West. Supp. 1976).
9. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976).
10. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), - Cal. 3d -, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1976).
11. Barro, Alternative Post-Serrano Systems and Their Expenditure Implications, in
SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION 36-42 (J. Pincus ed. 1974).
12. Id. at 36; see COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 3, at 64.
13. Barro, supra note 11, at 36.
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vides a fixed grant without requiring a minimum tax rate.1 4 Foundation
programs and flat grants provide some equalizing of educational re-
sources since property-poor districts may contribute less to the state
education fund than they receive as a flat grant or under the foundation
plan.'5 The equalizing effect of foundation plans, however, is
minimized by providing aid to all districts regardless of wealth,'16 by
allowing property-wealthy districts to augment their foundation aid,'
17
and by providing state aid at a level that is significantly lower than that
of the local districts. 8 The California school finance system is an
example of a flat grant-foundation aid system. 19
Foundation programs are designed to achieve some equalization of
educational resources while leaving local districts free to determine tax
rates and spending levels.20 Despite the equalizing effects of founda-
tion programs, district resource disparities persist as a result of the
unequal distribution of taxable wealth rather than the tax rates
selected. 2'
A. Federal Court Involvement in the School Finance Controversy
The attack on school finance systems began with McInnis v. Shap-
iro.22 Plaintiffs challenged the Illinois foundation plan23 arguing that
14. Id. at 36-37.
15. JOHNS & MORPHET, supra note 1, at 268; Note, Public Schools: Serrano v.
Priest-A Challenge to Kentucky, 60 KY. L.J. 156, 164 (1971).
16. JOHNS & MORPHET, supra note 1, at 268.
17. Id. at 253; Barro, supra note 11, at 37.
18. Barro, supra note 11, at 37.
19. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17300-18480 (Deering Supp. 1976). See Serrano v. Priest
(Serrano I), 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591-95, 487 P.2d 1241, 1245-48, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 605-08
(1971). See also Shanks, Educational Financing and Equal Protection: Will the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's Breakthrough Become the Law of the Land?, 1 J.L. & EDUC. 73,
73-75 (1972). California provides $125 per unit of average daily attendance as basic aid.
See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 17601.1, 17616 (Deering Supp. 1976). A district's foundation aid
is determined by adding the basic aid and the estimated revenue a district could generate
by taxing at a set rate of assessed valuation. See id. § 17702. The state then provides the
difference between that sum and the statutory foundation level. See id. §§ 17655, 17656.
Wealthy school districts are able to generate substantially more than the foundation level
by taxing at or below the set rate, but there is no provision for the recapture of funds
above the foundation level.
20. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1973).
21. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (L. Div. 1972), aff'd, 62
N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (Robinson I), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). See BERKE. supra
note 2, at 6-7, Table II, 10.
22. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. II. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394
U.S. 322 (1969).
23. Id. at 330.
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"only a financing system which apportions public funds according to
the educational needs of the students satisfies the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. "24 The district court, however, found the case nonjusticiable for
lack of a manageable standard.25 The court refused to involve itself in a
determination of equal educational opportunity, finding educational
need to be a "nebulous concept"26 more appropriately left to the
legislature. 27
To avoid the Mclnnis "educational needs" problem, 28 other chal-
lenges to school financing plans have been based on the principle of
fiscal neutrality: "the quality of public education may not be a function
of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole.''29 In San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,30 plaintiffs argued
that the Texas school finance system resulted in a child's education
being a function of the wealth of the school district in which the child
lived and thus violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
24. Id. at 331 (emphasis in original).
25. Id. at 335-36.
26. 293 F. Supp. at 335. One of the major issues of school finance reform is to give
content to the phrase "equal educational opportunity." Equal educational output as
determined by scores on standardized tests has been suggested as an appropriate stan-
dard, see R. JOHNS, K. ALEXANDER, & F. JORDON, FINANCING EDUCATION 436-38 (1972),
but the output standard raises the problem of establishing a positive correlation between
money spent and the education purchased, see note 61 infra. Equality of input has also
been suggested, see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 84
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793,799-800,
537 P.2d 635, 641-42 (1975). See generally Note, Equal Educational Opportunity: A Case
for the Children, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 280, 296-97 (1971) (discussing nine possible
definitions for "equal opportunity"). For a discussion of "equal educational opportuni-
ty" in the school desegregation context see Feiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public
Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REv. 564 (1965).
The relationship between educational resources and educational quality was the only
issue for trial on remand in Serrano L See Karst, Serrano v. Priest's Inputs and Outputs,
38 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 333 (1974). The trial court held that such a correlation did
exist, and based its decision on an input standard. Id. at 343. The court relied on the
testimony of school officials, primarily from property-wealthy districts, who claimed
that their programs would be harmed if funds were reduced. Defendants thus admitted
the cost-quality correlation plaintiffs were to have proven. Serrano v. Priest, No. 938,
254 at 89 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 1974).
27. 293 F. Supp. at 332. McInnis was relied on in Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp.
572, 574 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970), to dismiss a challenge to the
Virginia school finance system.
28. Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 369.
29. COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN. supra note 3, at 2. See Andersen, supra note 1, at
862 (the principle of fiscal neutrality requires that educational resources be distributed
fairly but not necessarily equally; it prohibits distributing educational resources on the
basis of taxable wealth but does not require any specific spending level).
30. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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amendment. 31 A three-judge court agreed,32 but the United States
Supreme Court reversed. 33 The Court admitted that education was of
"grave significance," but refused to find education to be a fundamen-
tal right guaranteed under the federal equal protection clause. 34 The
Court further found no suspect classification based on wealth since
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the Texas school finance
system worked to the disadvantage of an identifiable indigent class.35
The Court applied the rational relationship test 36 and upheld the Texas
plan, finding the plan to be a reasonable attempt to further the legiti-
mate state interest of maintaining local control over school financing. 37
The opinion recognized that had education been explicitly guaran-
teed by the federal constitution and thus a fundamental right, the
Texas plan could not have withstood the strict scrutiny test which
would necessarily have been applied. 38 Nearly every state constitution
31. Id.
32. 337 F. Supp. 280 (N.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
33. 411 U.S. at 1.
34. Id. at 30. Plaintiffs in Rodriguez argued that education was a fundamental right
because of its close relationship ("nexus") to other guaranteed rights, specifically the
right to vote and freedom of speech. Id. at 35. The Court recognized such a nexus but
found that it was not the function of the courts "to guarantee to the citizenry the most
effective speech or the most informed electoral choice." Id. at 36 (emphasis in original).
The Court left open the possibility that the Texas school finance system might infringe a
fundamental right if it "occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to
any of its children." Id. at 37. The Court emphasized that rather than depriving Texas
children of a fundamental right, the Texas system was an affirmative attempt to extend a
quality education to all Texas students. Id. at 38-39.
35. Id. at 23. Plaintiffs' difficulty was defining their class to fit the Court's analysis of
suspect classifications based on wealth. The Court found that defining the class as those
relatively poorer than others or those who happen to live in poor districts would not meet
its test for suspectness: the class must be completely unable to pay for some desired
benefit and as a result suffer an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to
enjoy that benefit. The Court then rejected the possibility that the finance system
discriminated against poor people. Id. at 18-26. Compare Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 5
Cal. 3d 584, 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 612 (1971) (decided before
Rodriguez) (plaintiffs defined their class as those living in all but the wealthiest districts
and the court found discrimination based on district wealth), with Northshore School
Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974) (no correlation between
district wealth and individual wealth could be established but plaintiffs did establish that
a significant number of poor people do live in poor districts). See generally Andersen,
supra note 1, at 884-85.
36. For a discussion of the strict scrutiny and rational relationship tests used by the
Supreme Court in analyzing equal protection problems, see Gunther, Forward: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). See also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv.
L. REV. 1065 (1969).
37. 411 U.S. at 55.
38. Id. at 16-17.
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does explicitly require provision for education. 39 Consequently a basis
is provided for state courts to hold education to be a fundamental right
within the Rodriguez analysis. Challenges to school financing plans,
though effectively closed to federal courts by Rodriguez,' can be
raised under the education clause or the equal protection clause of
state constitutions. 41
B. State Court Challenges to School Finance Plans
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1)42 was decided by the California Su-
preme Court before Rodriguez. Plaintiffs challenged the California
school finance system arguing that they were denied equal protection
under both the federal and state constitutions because the quality of
their education was a function of the wealth of the school district in
which they lived rather than the wealth of the state as a whole. 43 The
trial court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.' On appeal, the Supreme Court of California remanded for
trial, 45 finding that under plaintiffs' allegations, the California system
denied their fundamental right to an education 46 and discriminated on
39. All state constitutions except South Carolina have an education clause. See
generally Moore, In Aid of Public Education: An Analysis of the Education Article of the
Virginia Constitution of 1971, 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 263, 271 n.40 (1971); Ruvoldt, supra
note 3, at 15-16 n.90; Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 408 n.224.
40. But see Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 367-77 (arguing that future challenges in
federal court can overcome the suspect classification problem of Rodriguez by demon-
strating that: "(1) present inequities are not the result of happenstance, as the majority
suggested, but of a history of deliberate economic segregation or other purposeful
discrimination; (2) poor districts are politically impotent; (3) there is a stigma attached to
living in education-poor, property-poor districts; and (4) geographical mobility is not a
reality for many residents in those districts.").
41. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 31 Conn. Supp. 377, 332 A.2d 113 (Super. Ct. 1974).
Compare Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973) (court relied on the
Rodriguez interpretation of the Federal Constitution despite the MICH. CONST. art. 8, 1 §
2, requiring that the state "maintain and support" the Michigan public school system),
with Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973) (ARIz. CONST, art. XI, § I and
art. XI, § 6 establish education as a fundamental right under the Arizona equal protection
clause, but the school finance system is not unconstitutional if "rational, reasonable and
neither discriminatory nor capricious." Id. at 90-91, 515 F.2d at 592.).
42. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
43. Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
44. Id. at 591, 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
45. Id. at 619, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
46. Id. at 608-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19. The court based its
holding on the belief that "education is a major determinant of an individual's chances
for economic and social success in our competitive society [and] education is a unique
influence on a child's development as a citizen and his participation in political and
community life." Id. at 605, 487 P.2d.at 1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
1977]
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the basis of wealth, a suspect classification. 47
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in Serrano I1.
48
Significantly, contrary to the suggestion of Rodriquez, the court in
Serrano II found it unnecessary to establish the fundamentality of
education by any explicit constitutional guarantee. 49 The supreme
47. Id. at 598-604, 487 P.2d at 1250-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-15. Plaintiffs' class
consisted of all children attending public schools in California except those children in
the school district affording the greatest educational opportunities. Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at
1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
The Serrano I court implied that district wealth should be considered a suspect
classification: "More basically, . . . we reject defendants underlying thesis that classifi-
cation by wealth is constitutional so long as the wealth is that of the district, not the
individual. We think that discrimination on the basis of district wealth is equally in-
valid." Id. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612. But see Goldstein, Interdistrict
Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and its
Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504, 527-34 (1972) (basing the wealth classification on a
district's tax base raises the problem of "voluntary" poverty since local governments
can choose to exclude industrial or commercial development). See also Coons Introduc-
tion: Fiscal Neutrality After Rodriguez, 38 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 299, 303 (1974)
(arguing for establishing a class of education-poor: those who are unable to purchase
private alternatives to the public school system).
48. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), - Cal. 3d-, -, 557 P.2d 929,951, 135 Cal. Rptr.
345, 367 (1976). The Serrano I holding based on the federal equal protection clause was
overruled by Rodriguez. Id. at -, 557 P.2d at 945, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 361. Other courts
have interpreted their state equal protection clauses in accordance with the Rodriguez
interpretation of the federal clause. See Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 800, 537
P.2d 635, 642 (1975); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685,725,
530 P.2d 178, 200 (1974) (Rodriguez controlling on interpretation of state constitution);
Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. 473, 492-99, 303 A.2d 273, 283-86, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973) (Rodriguez controlling on interpretation of state equal protection
clause). But see Horton v. Meskill, 31 Conn. Supp. 377, 332 A.2d 113 (Super. Ct. 1974)
(Rodriguez is controlling on the interpretation of the federal equal protection clause and
would be controlling on interpretation of the state equal protection clause if not for an
education clause in the state constitution).
49. - Cal. 3d at -, 557 P.2d at 949-50, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66. See Shofstall v.
Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973) (ARIZ. CONSr. art. XI, § I and art. XI, § 6
requires the legislature to provide a general and uniform system of free schools and
establish education as a fundamental right under the state equal protection clause but the
school finance system is no different than other governmental services and is not
unconstitutional if rational and non-discriminatory); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho
793, 804-05, 537 P.2d 635, 646-47 (1975) (despite art. 9, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution,
which requires the state to "establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough
system of public, free common schools," the Supreme Court of Idaho refused to find
that education was a fundamental right); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84
Wash. 2d 685, 720, 530 P.2d 178, 198 (the State's obligation to provide for the education
of all students under WASH. CONsT. Art. 9 "is the same as any other major duty or
function of state government" and does not create a fundamental right under the
Washington privileges and immunities clause). But see Horton v. Meskill, 31 Conn.
Supp. 377, 332 A.2d 113 (Super. Ct. 1974) (the education clause of the Connecticut
Constitution establishes a fundamental right under the Connecticut equal protection
clause).
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court held that education is a fundamental interest covered by the
state's equal protection clause and school financing based on district
wealth discriminates against a suspect class.50 The court thus applied
the strict scrutiny test and determined that the state had not established
that the California school finance system served a compelling state
interest.51 The court found the state's asserted interest in local control
to be "chimerical. 52
Robinson v. Cahill53 was decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court
shortly after Rodriguez. The New Jersey Consitution states that "the
legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough
and efficient system of free public schools." 54 In Robinson, plaintiffs55
challenged the New Jersey school finance system under the state equal
protection clause,56 arguing that the "thorough and efficient" clause
made education a fundamental interest,57 and directly under the educa-
tion clause,58 arguing that the guarantee of a thorough and efficient
education was not being met in property-poor districts.5 9 The trial court
found the New Jersey system unconstitutional under both the educa-
tion6° and equal protection 61 clauses of the state constitution.
50. - Cal. 3d at -, 557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
51. Id. at-, 557 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
52. Id. at -, 557 P.2d at 953, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
53. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (Robinson I), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
54. N.J. CONsT. art. 8, § 4, 1.
55. Plaintiffs represented public school students deprived of an equal educational
opportunity, property owners bearing an unequal tax burden, and all public officials
charged with providing an equal educational opportunity but unable to do so because of
the New Jersey finance system. Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 385; see Ruvoldt, supra
note 3, at 5-6.
56. N.J. CONST. art. I, 1.
57. 62 N.J. at 496, 303 A.2d at 285.
58. See text at note 54 supra; Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 386.
59. 62 N.J. at 501, 303 A.2d at 287-88. Plaintiffs also challenged the New Jersey
school finance system under a property taxation provision of the New Jersey Constitu-
tion: "Property shall be assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform rules.
All real property assessed and taxed locally or by the State for allotment and payment to
taxing districts should be assessed according to the same standard of value. ... N.J.
CONsT. art. VIII, § 1, 1. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the taxation challenge
by holding that the clause does not prohibit delegating state functions to local govern-
ments, but only requires that if the state provides a service and funds it through the
property tax, the tax must be uniform. 62 N.J. at 502-03, 303 A.2d at 288. See Tracten-
berg, supra note 3, at 414-15.
60. 118 N.J. Super. 223, 270, 287 A.2d 187, 211 (L. Div. 1972). aff'd, 62 N.J. 473,303
A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). The trial court relied on Landis v. School
Dist. No. 44, 57 N.J.L 509, 31 A. 1017 (1895), to hold that "thorough and efficient"
means just that and not simply adequate or minimal. But see Shofstall v. Hollins, 110
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In a unanimous decision,62 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
(Robinson 1) found that plaintiffs had been denied a thorough and
efficient education, 63 but refused to find a denial of equal protection.6
Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973) (Arizona school finance system does not violate education
clause); Thomson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 805, 537 P.2d 635, 647 (1975) (the state
education clause "does not guarantee to the children of this state a right to be educated
in such a manner that all services and facilities are equal throughout the state."
(emphasis in original)); Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685,
530 P.2d 178 (1974) (Washington state school finance system does not violate education
clause).
61. 118 N.J. Super. at 279-90, 287 A.2d at 216. New Jersey does not have an explicit
equal protection clause. N.J. CONsT. art. I, I provides for "certain natural and
unalienable rights" and has been interpreted to provide for equal protection by implica-
tion. 118 N.J. Super. at 271, 287 A.2d at 212.
To establish their equal protection claim, plaintiffs in Robinson had to prove a
positive correlation between the money spent on education and the quality of the
education provided. Plaintiffs were able to demonstrate disparities in input based on the
quality of teaching personnel: wealthy districts had a lighter percentage of teachers with
master's degrees and more special education personnel; and the quality of the physical
facilities: buildings, textbooks, equipment, libraries. 118 N.J. Super. at 249-51, 287 A.2d
at 200-01. Plaintiffs demonstrated disparities in output based on an analysis of the
number of college-bound graduates and students' scores on standard educational per-
formance tests. Id. at 255, 287 A.2d at 204. See Ruvoldt, supra note 3, at 6-8. But see
Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974)
(finding a .85 correlation between taxable wealth and educational spending but conclud-
ing that educational resources are not related to the quality of education provided).
Establishing a cost/quality correlation has been one of the major problems of school
finance reform. See J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 325 (1966)
(concluding that inequalities of the child's home and background are more influential
that inequalities in education); C JENCKS, INEQUALITY 8 (1972) (concluding that educa-
tional resources do not have an effect on standardized test scores). But see J. GUTHRIE,
SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY 60-62 (1971) (criticizing the methodology of the Coleman
Report); Billings & Legler, Factors Affecting Educational Opportunity and Their Impli-
cations for School Finance Reform: An Empirical Study, 4 J.L. & EDUc. 633 (1975)
(finding that together educational expenditures and the percentage of non-white students
in a school have a significant effect on educational achievement); Richards, Equal
Opportunity and School Finance: Toward a Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32, 54 (1973) (suggesting that the Coleman study and other
similar studies are based on a very narrow concept of education-verbal skills).
Richards suggests that educational spending should be equalized regardless of its
effect on the quality of education because of it symbolic importance and its effect on
students' perceptions of the equality of all people. Richards, supra at 57. See also
Tractenberg, Robinson v. Cahill: The Thorough and Efficient Clause, supra note 2, at
332.
62. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973).
63. Id. at 505-21, 303 A.2d 290-98.
64. Id. at 482-501, 303 A.2d at 277-87. The New Jersey court was bound by the
Rodriguez decision in its interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 486-89, 303
A.2d at 279-81. As to the New Jersey equal protection clause, the court found neither a
suspect classification based on wealth, id. at 492-94, 303 A.2d at 283, nor a fundamental
right to an education, id. at 495, 303 A.2d at 284, despite the fact that the New Jersey
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The court was concerned that basing its decision on the equal protec-
tion clause might implicate all municipal services. Unequal tax bases
also result in some municipalities being able to provide better police
and fire protection. If variations in local expenditures for education
deny equal protection, then variations in local expenditures for other
essential services may also deny equal protection to those living in
poor municipalities. The court was unwilling to consider whether "lo-
cal government as a political institution denies equal protection.'"65 The
United States Supreme Court had voiced similar concerns in
Rodriguez. 66
The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding that the New Jersey
school finance system was unconstitutional under the state's education
clause was only the beginning of the Robinson litigation. The courts
and the state legislature wrestled with the implementation of a new
financing system for the next three years. Though founded on a differ-
rent constitutional principle than Serrano II, the difficulties suffered
by New Jersey may prove instructive to the courts and legislators of
California in their attempts to implement a new financing system
harmonious with Serrano II.
II. THE NEW JERSEY EXPERIENCE: BEYOND ROBINSON I
A. The Bateman Act
In Robinson I, the New Jersey court placed the responsibility for
correcting the fiscal disparities created by the New Jersey school
finance system squarely on the state legislature: "Whatever the reason
for the violation, the obligation is the State's to rectify it. If local
government fails, the State government must compel it to act, and if
the local government cannot carry the burden, the State must itself
meet its continuing obligation." 67
Prior to 1970 New Jersey financed its school systems through a
foundation program under which the state contributed twenty-eight
percent of the statewide operating costs.' In 1970 New Jersey enacted
constitution explicitly guarantees a right to an education. The court found other rights
were also explicitly guaranteed but not "fundmental." Id. at 491, 303 A.2d at 282.
65. Id. at 500, 303 A.2d at 287.
66. 411 U.S. at 40.
67. 62 N.J. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294.
68. Id. at 516, 303 A.2d at 296. The pre-1970 Act provided for a statewide minimum
guarantee of $100 per pupil and foundation program of $400 per pupil. Each district was
to receive the minimum aid plus the difference between the "local fair share" raised by
taxing at 10.5 mills and the $400 foundation. Id. at 516-17, 303 A.2d at 296. See
Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 387.
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the State School Incentive Equalization Aid Law (The Bateman Act)69
which provided for minimum support aid to all districts," equalization
aid based on a guaranteed assessed valuation,71 and categorical aid for
special programs. 72 The Bateman Act did little to improve the original
foundation plan.73 It was to have been phased in with full funding for
the 1974-75 school year. 74 Had the Act been fully funded it would have
provided equalization aid for only twenty-seven percent of the school
districts of New Jersey. 75
In Robinson I the New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
Bateman Act:
[The Bateman Act] is not demonstrably designed to guarantee that
local effort plus the State aid will yield to all the pupils in the State
that level of educational opportunity which the [New Jersey
Constitution] mandates. We see no basis for a finding that the
[Bateman] Act, even if fully funded, would satisfy the constitu-
tional obligation of the State. 76
Robinson I was decided in April, 1973. In June, 1973, the New Jersey
69. State School Incentive Equalization Aid Law (Bateman Act), ch. 234, [1970] N.J.
Laws 823. The Bateman Act was repealed by the Public School Education Act of 1975, §
54, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-33 (West Supp. 1976). See generally Berke & Sinkin,
supra note 2, at 346-50; Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 385 n.109.
70. State School Incentive Equalization Aid Law (Bateman Act), ch. 234, § 5, [1970]
N.J. Laws 823. The Bateman Act classified school districts as nonoperating, basic,
limited, intermediate, precomprehensive and comprehensive with minimum support aid
varying from $100 per weighted pupil in nonoperating districts to $160 per weighted pupil
in comprehensive districts. Id. § 2. No criteria were specified for classifying districts. All
districts would thus have received the basic rate of $110 per weighted pupil under the
Bateman Act.
71. Id. § 5. The guaranteed assessed property valuation was $30,000 per weighted
pupil in basic districts. Id. § 2.
72. The Bateman Act provided state aid for transportation (75% of transportation
costs paid by the state) and increased aid for vocational education from $100 to $320
per pupil. Id. § 7.
73. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. 473,518, 303 A.2d 273,296, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973). The Bateman Act would have increased the state's contribution to
education from 28% to 40%. Id. Equalization aid under the Bateman Act would have
benefited only 27% of New Jersey's school districts, those with average assessed
property valuation of less than $38,000 per pupil. More than half of the state aid under
the Bateman Act was distributed to all districts as minimum support. Berke & Sinkin,
supra note 2, at 348.
74. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 479-80, 355 A.2d 129, 145 (1976)
(Conford, J., concurring and dissenting).
75. Id. at 486, 355 A.2d at 148.
76. 62 N.J. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297. But see Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 441
(Robinson I rejection of Bateman Act was focused primarily on its revenue-raising
dimension and its failure to give content to the education clause rather than its revenue
distribution).
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Supreme Court ordered the state legislature to enact a nondiscrimina-
tory finance system to become effective for the 1975-76 school year
(Robinson II).77 That deadline was later extended another year (Robin-
son III) .78
In Robinson IV79 the court reluctantly ordered the distribution of
nearly $300 million of minimum support8° and save-harmless aid81
according to the equalization scheme of the previously rejected Bate-
man Act.82 The New Jersey legislature contended that the supreme
court did not have the authority to so redistribute state funds. The
Legislature argued that the education clause specifies that the state
legislature alone has the power to provide for a public school system.
The court rejected the argument, asserting that it had taken affirmative
steps to redress violations of constitutional rights in other instances. 83
The legislature also argued that the New Jersey Constitution specifical-
ly prohibits court redistribution of state funds: "No money shall be
drawn from the state treasury but for appropriations made by law. '" 84
The court responded that a redistribution of state funds already ap-
77. 63 N.J. 196, 198, 306 A.2d 65, 66 (1973).
78. 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975).
79. 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
80. Minimum support is that aid provided to all districts under a foundation program
regardless of the district's taxable wealth. E.g., State School Incentive Equalization Aid
Law (Bateman Act), ch. 234, § 7, [1970] N.J. Laws 823. Minimum support amounted to
$234 million in New Jersey during the 1974-75 school year. 69 N.J. at 148, 351 A.2d at
720.
81. The save-harmless provision allows wealthy districts to continue spending at their
present level though it may well be above the state equalization level. E.g., State School
Incentive Equalization Aid Law (Bateman Act), ch. 234, § 15, [1970] N.J. Laws 823.
Save-harmless aid amounted to $7.6 million in New Jersey during the 1974-75 school
year. 69 N.J. at 148, 351 A.2d at 720.
82. 69 N.J. at 150, 351 A.2d at 722. The court limited its redistribution to the 1976-77
school year since "the Courts function is to appraise compliance with the Constitution,
not to legislate an educational system .... " Id. at 145, 351 A.2d at 719. Redistributing
minimum support and save-harmless aid would have resulted in raising the guaranteed
assessed property valuation lev@l from $43,000 to $67,000 per pupil for the 1976-77
school year. Id. at 150, 351 A.2d at 722.
Justice Pashman concurred in the court's decision to redistribute minimum support
and save-harmless aid but felt the court should have gone even further. Id. at 155-74, 351
A.2d at 724-35. He relied on language in Robinson I requiring the state to either compel
local districts to raise support funds to provide a thorough and efficient education or
provide those funds from state resources. Id. at 158, 351 A.2d at 726.
83. Id. at 152-55, 351 A.2d at 722-24. An analogy can be drawn to affirmative court
intervention in other areas such as school desegregation and reapportionment. See
Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 453-54.
84. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § II.
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propriated by law did not violate the state constitution.85 In the event
of an actual conflict, the court held that the education clause would
control over the appropriation clause, implying that it was not pre-
cluded from ordering the state legislature to appropriate sufficient
funds to finance the public school system. 86 As the dissent pointed out,
such an order would conflict with the separation of powers doctrine.
Judicial "legislation" can generally be checked by legislative action
overruling the court decision, but judicial allocation of state funds
cannot be checked by the legislature 7
B. The 1975 Act
In September, 1975, more than two years after the state supreme
court declared New Jersey's school finance system to be unconstitu-
tional, the state legislature enacted the Public School Education Act of
1975.88 The 1975 Act is patterned after the Bateman Act.89 It provides
for minimum aid to all districts,90 equalization aid91 based on guaran-
teed assessed valuation 92 and categorical aid for special programs. 93 If
fully funded, the 1975 Act will provide equalization aid for sixty-four
percent of the school districts of New Jersey, 94 a substantial improve-
ment over the Bateman Act. 95
85. 69 N.J. at 152-54, 351 A.2d at 722-24.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 179-80, 351 A.2d at 737-38 (Mountain & Clifford, JJ., dissenting). See San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
88. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-1 to 7A-33 (West Supp. 1976).
89. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 478-79, 355 A.2d 129, 144 (1976)
(Conford, J., concurring and dissenting).
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-18(c) (West Supp. 1976).
91. Id. § 7A-18(a) to 18(b). Both current expenses and capital and debt service costs
are to be computed under the equalization scheme. Id. § 18A: 7A-19. See Robinson v.
Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 539-40, 355 A.2d 129, 177 (1976) (Pashman, J.,
dissenting).
92. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-3 (West Supp. 1976); see Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson
V), 69 N.J. 449, 464-65, 355 A.2d 129, 137 (1976). The 1975 Act establishes a guaranteed
assessed valuation per pupil of 1.3 times the state average for the 1976-77 school year
and 1.35 times the state average thereafter. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-3 (West Supp.
1976).
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-20 (West Supp. 1976) (categorical aid is to be provided
for special education classes).
94. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 485-86, 355 A.2d 129, 148 (Con-
ford, J., concurring and dissenting). At a guaranteed valuation level of 1.35 times the
state average, 368 of the 578 New Jersey school districts would be below the guaranteed
level and thus would receive equalization aid (64% of all New Jersey districts). These 368
districts included 73.5% of New Jersey public school students. Id.
95. Id. Under the Bateman Act, 157 districts (27.2%) would have received equaliza-
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In addition to providing financial support for New Jersey's public
schools, the 1975 Act also attempts to define a "thorough and effi-
cient" education as "the educational opportunity which will prepare
[all children in New Jersey] to function politically, economically and
socially in a democratic society.' 91 The Act provides for comprehen-
sive review of the state educational system by the Commissioner of
Education, considering each district and school individually.97 The
Commissioner and State Board of Education are empowered to order
changes necessary to assure a thorough and efficient education in all
schools, including "necessary budget changes within the school
district."
C. Robinson V
In January, 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court approved the 1975
Act (Robinson V) conditioned upon the legislature fully funding the
tion aid for the 1976-77 school year and would have included 38.5% of all New Jersey
public school students. Id.
96. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A (West Supp. 1976). See Brief for Defendant-Attorney
General at 24, Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976) (of the
43 states that responded to a Department of Education survey, 13 had "thorough and
efficient" clauses but none could provide a concise definition). The State Attorney
General argued that the Act need only provide a framework within which the state
Department of Education and local districts could define a "thorough and efficient"
education for their students. Id. at 27-28. See also Report of the Joint Education
Committee to the New Jersey Legislature 4 (1974) ("the local school district must have
considerable freedom and encouragement to innovate and experiment. . . otherwise,
educational practice will stagnate and rigidify").
The 1975 Act enumerates several elements of a "thorough and efficient" education.
The list includes: establishing educational goals with local participation in that process;
providing instruction in the basic skills sufficient to attain a reasonable level of proficien-
cy; offering a broad program with supportive services for educationally handicapped
students; adequately equipping physical facilities; establishing an efficient administra-
tive system and an adequate research program; hiring qualified personnel; and evaluating
and monitoring all programs. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-5 (West Supp. 1976).
97. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-14 to 7A-16 (West Supp. 1976). The Commissioner is
to revise the criteria for a "thorough and efficient" education as necessary, relative to
societal changes, and is to evaluate district performance against those criteria. Id. See
Brief for Defendant-Attorney General at 7, Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J.
449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976) (suggesting that each district evaluation might be based on "the
employability of its graduates or their ability to gain entrance to institutions of higher
education").
98. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-15 (West Supp. 1976). The dissent in Robinson V
urged that the legislature did not intend to grant the Commissioner and State Board such
broad power, arguing that "budget changes" did not refer to budgetary increases since
the Act fails to provide a source of revenue for such increases. 69 N.J. at 512-62, 355
A.2d at 163-89 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
99. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976).
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Act for the 1976-77 school year. 100 The court considered the 1975 Act
as a "full and complete plan designed to provide a thorough and
efficient education,"''1 1 emphasizing that the fiscal provisions should
be evaluated in light of the legislature's attempt to deal comprehensive-
ly with public education in New Jersey. 0 2 The court considered
whether the fiscal provisions provided sufficient financial support for
New Jersey's educational system."13 By considering the 1975 Act as a
whole rather than in two parts (one defining a thorough and efficient
education and the other establishing a system of financing) and by
evaluating the 1975 Act against a standard of sufficiency, rather than
equality, the court was able to approve a financing plan that falls far
short of equality of financial resources among all school districts.1 4
The 1975 Act is weak in several specific areas. 105 The Act's equaliza-
tion plan fails to provide equalizing aid for over one-third of New
Jersey's school districts,"° and the aid is based on equalized property
valuation, not equalized dollar input per pupil. 107 There is provision for
minimum support to all districts regardless of wealthl° and a save-
100. Id. at 468-69, 355 A.2d at 139.
101. Id. at 463-64, 355 A.2d at 136.
102. Id.
103. Id. See Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 62 N.J. 473, 514-15, 303 A.2d 273,
294-95, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), quoting Landis v. School Dist. No. 44, 57
N.J.L. 509, 512, 31A.1017, 1018 (1895). But see Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 418
("thorough" literally means "complete with attention to detail, not basic or adequate").
104. 69 N.J. at 490-93, 355 A.2d at 150-51 (Conford, J., concurring and dissenting).
The 1975 Act provides little more equalization than the court-ordered redistribution of
Robinson IV which "was only a step in the direction of achievement of full equalization
of educational resources." Id. See Brief by the New Jersey Education Reform Project as
amici curiae at 17, Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976)
(Districts in the poorest class, having an average property wealth of $22,625, would
receive $1253 per pupil under the 1975 Act fully funded and $1184 per pupil under the
Robinson IV court-ordered distribution. Districts having an average property wealth of
$32,569 would receive $962 under the 1975 Act and $874 under Robinson IV. Districts in
the three wealthiest classes having over $80,000 average assessed valuation per pupil
would receive $275 under the 1975 Act but nothing under Robinson IV).
105. See Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 512-62, 355 A.2d 129, 163-89
(1976) (Pashman, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 541, 355 A.2d at 178.
107. Justice Pashman relied on the trial court's conclusion that there is a positive
correlation between "dollar input per pupil" and the quality of education. Id. at 543-44,
355 A.2d at 179, citing 118.N.J. Super. 223, 237-38, 249, 287 A.2d 187, 194, 200 (L. Div.
1972), aff'd, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (Robinson I), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
108. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-18(c) (West Supp. 1976) (all districts are to receive at
least 19% of the state support limit). See Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449,
492-93, 355 A.2d 129, 152 (Conford, J., concurring and dissenting).
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harmless provision'09 to protect wealthy districts. These funds were
redistributed in Robinson IV upon finding that they were inconsistent
with achieving the goal of equality of educational resources.1 0 The Act
also provides for categorical aid which is distributed according to the
types of programs a district provides rather than financial need."'
Under the Act the state will not provide more than sixty-five percent of
a district's total budget regardless of need." 2 The purpose of such a
limit is to prevent school districts from unreasonably inflating their
budgets to obtain increased state aid."' But, if property-poor districts
are unable to provide a "thorough and efficient" education on a
sixty-fifth percentile budget, then that limit may operate to prevent the
state from meeting its obligation in those districts." 4 Finally, the Act
fails to take municipal overburden into account." 5 The Act does not
compensate for the increasing costs of providing municipal services
other than education in large metropolitan areas." 6 In both Robinson
109. Public School Education Act of 1975, ch. 212, §§ 55-56, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law
Serv. 519 (West).
110. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 69 N.J. 133, 149-51, 351 A.2d 713, 721-22
(1975). "In a world of limited resources and serious disparities in the wealth and
expenditure levels of local districts, minimum support and save-harmless aid tend to
exacerbate rather than alleviate current inequities." Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69
N.J. 449, 546-47, 355 A.2d 129, 181 (1976) (Pashman, J., dissenting). Justice Conford
argued that the minimum aid provision of the 1975 Act is more invidious than that held
unconstitutional in the Bateman Act since the aid will be distributed only to districts
above the equalization level rather than all districts. Id. at 492-93, 355 A.2d at 152
(Conford, J., concurring and dissenting).
11. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A-7A-20 (West Supp. 1976); see Robinson v. Cahill (Robin-
son V), 69 N.J. 449, 548-49, 355 A.2d 129, 182 (1976) (Pashman, J., dissenting). The
categorical aid is constitutionally suspect under the court's "sufficiency" approach in
that it may draw funds from the state's educational appropriation which might otherwise
be used to provide a minimum level of educational opportunity to poor districts.
112. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-3 (West Supp. 1976).
113. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 553,355 A.2d 129, 182 (Pashman,
J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 553-57, 355 A.2d at 184-86.
116. Municipal overburden is a term used to describe the problem of providing
educational programs in communities where tax resources are limited because of
competition for the local tax dollar from other essential services, such as public
safety, public welfare and the administration of justice. So long as the schools must
turn to local tax resources for a portion of their revenue, the potential for a
municipal overburden problem will exist.
Report of the Joint Education Committee to the New Jersey Legislature 37 (1974). See
Berke, supra note 2, at 31, 78, 134; Berke & Sinkin, supra note 2, at 342, 344 Table II
(five out of six metropolitan school districts in New Jersey are below the median in
property valuation but above the median in tax rate); Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 391
n. 137 (In New Jersey, 58% of the total tax rate is spent on education, but in the six
metropolitan school districts-Camden, Newark, Jersey City, Trenton, Paterson, and
Elizabeth-only 47% of the total tax rate is spent on education.).
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i 17 and Robinson IV' 18 the court acknowledged the problem of munici-
pal overburden. Other states have also recognized the problem and
attempted to compensate for it.119
D. The Revenue Dimension of the New Jersey Plan
The conflict between the need for legislative reform and the legisla-
ture's reluctance to act is illustrated by the New Jersey litigation and
the state legislature's attempts to implement the Robinson decision.
The supreme court's approval of the 1975 Public School Education Act
was made specifically conditional upon full funding of the state con-
tribution. 120 By May, 1976, nine months after the 1975 Act was
enacted, the legislature had not funded the state contribution. The
New Jersey supreme court enjoined the State's operation of an uncon-
stitutional school system (Robinson VI). '2 The court acknowledged
that an injunction may not be the most effective remedy for legislative
inaction, but noted that in the Robinson litigation the court had played
an active role and was not abdicating its responsibility to protect the
constitutional rights of New Jersey public school students. 122 The court
in Robinson VI had considered redistributing all funds actually ap-
propriated by the legislature according to the equalization scheme of
the 1975 Act, a remedy similar to the redistribution plan of Robinson
IV,123 but rejected that alternative in part because it would have
117. 62 N.J. at 519, 303 A.2d at 297; see Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J.
449, 553-56, 355 A.2d 129, 184-85 (1976) (Pashman, J., dissenting).
118. 69 N.J. at 151-52, 351 A.2d at 722; see Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J.
449, 554-55, 355 A.2d 129, 185 (1976) (Pashman, J., dissenting).
119. Grubb, supra note 6, at 469. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-50-105(1973)
(school districts of more than 300,000 residents receive 1.5 times the state support level).
120. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J. at 475, 355 A.2d at 139. The Robinson
I decision required that the state provide a "thorough and efficient" education. It did not
require a uniform statewide tax to raise the education revenues. 62 N.J. at 502-03, 303
A.2d at 288. See Brief for Defendant-Attorney General at 36, Robinson v. Cahill
(Robinson V), 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976) (arguing that the revenue dimension of
the 1975 Act was not relevant to the constitutionality of the Act under the state's
education clause); Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 429-30 ("The court could have re-
stricted itself to the revenue dimension side of school funding and left the revenue-
raising side solely to legislative discretion. Arguably that would have been more consis-
tent with its emphasis on the constitutional rights of children and its rejection of the
constitutional rights of taxpayers."). But see Robinson v. Cahill, (Robinson I) 62 N.J.
473, 520, 303 A.2d 273, 297, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) ("it may be doubted that a
thorough and efficient system of schools . . . can realistically be met by reliance upon
local taxation.").
121. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976).
122. Id. at 160 n.l, 358 A.2d at 459 n.l.
123. 69 N.J. at 475, 355 A.2d at 139.
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benefited wealthier school districts.124
Much of the political attractiveness of school finance reform stems
from its promise of tax reform necessary to generate the increased
state revenues needed to finance the plans. 12 The particular dilemma
for any legislature is the property tax: it produces substantial rev-
enue126 but is a regressive tax.127 It may be necessary to retain some
form of property tax as part of any reform plan to avoid significant
appreciation in property values and to assure fiscal stability. 128 Thus
124. Brief for the New Jersey Education Reform Project at 22-23, Robinson v. Cahill
(Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976). See note 104 supra. The court could
have considered other non-affirmative forms of relief to pressure a legislative solution
such as enjoining districts above the statewide average from raising additional funds
locally. Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 455.
125. Meltsner & Nakamura, Political Implications of Serrano, in SCHOOL FINANCE IN
TRANSITION 273 (J. Pincus ed. 1974).
126. In 1972, 54.4% of all state and local revenues in New Jersey were raised through
the property tax. The national average was 38.7%. Report of the Joint Education
Committee to the New Jersey Legislature at 21 (1974), citing Summary Report of the
New Jersey Tax Policy Committee at 3 (1973). The percentage of state revenues raised
through the property tax varies from a high of 14.3% in Arizona to a low of .1% in
Illinois, Vermont and West Virginia. Hartman & Reischhauer, The Effect of Reform in
School Finance on the Level and Distribution of Tax Burdens, in SCHOOL FINANCE IN
TRANSITION 116-18, Tables 4 & 5 (J. Pincus ed.1974).
The local share of the cost of education is raised primarily through the property tax.
Id. at 119. Local districts might shift to sales or income taxes but consumer expenditures
and personal income are more mobile tax bases than real property. Differences in local
sales or income tax rates might thus have a substantial effect on residential and shopping
locations. Id. at 145.
127. See BERKE, supra note 2, at 32; Ruvoldt, supra note 3, at 28. The property tax is
considered regressive since it consumes a higher portion of the current incomes of poor
families. When measured against long-term income, however, the property tax may in
fact be a progressive tax. The progressive tax argument is based on data indicating that
low-income homeowners are often young, old, or temporarily unemployed, having
purchased their home based on their long-term income rather than their temporarily low
current income, and that high-income families often own homes that are more valuable
relative to their income than do low-income families. Hartman & Reischauer, supra note
126, at 120. Property taxes on apartments are often passed on in rent, though not
specified as such; thus in the case of low-income families who live in rented apartments,
the property tax may be less regressive than their rent/income ratio indicates since
properties normally rented by lower-income families tend to be more costly to maintain
making rent less representative of actual value. High-income families who live in rented
apartments generally rent properties with high value/rent ratios making the rent/tax ratio
more proportional as well. Id. at 121.
The regressive effect of the property tax may be due in part to its administration:
low-income housing is often assessed at a higher fraction of its true market value than is
high-income housing. Id. at 122. Several states have reformed the administration of the
property tax system by centralizing assessments as part of school finance reform
legislation. Grubb, supra note 6, at 466.
128. Generally, real property is owned by higher-income groups. Removing a 2%
property tax could cause an appreciation in property values of 20%. Hartman & Reis-
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circuit-breakers 29 or split assessment 3 ° provisions have been pro-
posed to alleviate the regressive effect of the property tax. The deci-
sion as to the particular tax scheme to be adopted, however, must be
based on the unique characteristics of each state.'
In response to the court's injunction, the General Assembly enacted
a two percent gross income tax to fund the 1975 Act. 132 The tax is
expected to yield one billion dollars in 1977.133 Three hundred seventy-
four million dollars of that one billion will be used to fund the 1975
Act.134 The scheme also includes provisions to lower property taxes by
exempting part of the assessed value of personal residences, 35 limiting
chauer, supra note 126, at 146. Shifting to a statewide property tax would also have a
significant effect on property values, but the effect would be to raise the value of
property in less wealthy districts and decrease the value in more wealthy districts
because property-wealthy districts would have to pay the same tax as property-poor
districts. Id. See Ruvoldt, supra note 3, at 24.
129. A "circuit-breaker" cuts in when the tax reaches a specified percentage of the
family's income. See Odden, Circuit Breaker Techniques for the Property Tax, in NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR EDUCATION (Kelly ed. 1973). The FLEISHMANN COMMISSION recom-
mended that "any family paying more than 10 per cent of state taxable income in
property taxes for schools to credit the excess against their state income tax bill."
FLEISHMANN REPORT, supra note 5, at 81. The state would reimburse those who pay no
income tax. Id.
130. Split assessments tax buisiness but not residential property, or taxes them at
different rates. Assessing residential and commercial property at differing rates avoids
the problem of increasing homeowner taxes and places the tax burden on property that
generates income. Meltsner & Nakamara, supra note 125, at 274. Agricultural and
commercial interests might, however, present serious political opposition to split assess-
ment. Id. at 275.
131. Hartman & Reischauer, supra note 126, at 141. The decision should be based
primarily on the effect various taxes have on the distribution of taxes among individuals.
For example, increasing sales or income taxes and decreasing property taxes would
benefit industrial, commercial and nonresident property owners. The opposite effect
would be achieved by raising corporate income taxes and lowering residential property
taxes; corporate income taxes may not, however, be capable of producing the revenue
needed to finance a state's public school system. Id. at 141-42.
132. New Jersey Gross Income Tax Act, ch. 47, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 103
(West) (to be codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 54A: 1-1 to 9-27).
133. SENATE REVENUE. FINANCE AND APPROPRIATIONS COMM., 197TH N.J. LEGIS., IST
SESS., STATEMENT TO ASSEMBLY COMM., SUBSTITUTE FOR A. 1513, at 1 (1976).
134. Act of July 1, 1976, ch. 42, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 90 (West).
135. Homestead Exemptions, ch. 72, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 234 (West) (to be
codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A: 4-3.80 to 4-3.94). For property valued at less than
$15,000 the exemption is computed by adding 2% times two-thirds the equalized valua-
tion and 25% of the local effective tax rate times two-thirds the equalized valuation. For
property valued at more than $15,000 the exemption is $10,000. The cost of such
exemptions was estimated to be $360 million per year. SENATE REVENUE, FINANCE AND
APPROPRIATIONS COMM., 197TH N.J. LEGIS., IST SESS., STATEMENT TO ASSEMBLY COMM.,
SUBSTITUTE FOR A. 1330. at 2 (1976).
To assure that the property tax credit would benefit those renting homes and apart-
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growth in public expenditures, 3 6 and repealing specific business
taxes. 137
III. ROBINSON V AND SERRANO II
The decision in Robinson I was based entirely on the education
clause of the state constitution. 3 8 The Robinson V court thus consid-
ered the equalizing provisions of the 1975 Act within the context of a
comprehensive education statute. 39 In approving the fiscal provisions
of the Act, the court conditioned approval on the implementation of
expanded powers in the office of the State Commissioner of Educa-
tion. 40 The Commissioner is to be authorized to order increases in
local school budgets when deemed necessary.' 4' The court assumed
the 1975 Act would not be static, as the foundation program had been,
ments, the Tenants' Property Tax Rebate Act provides that landlords must pass 50% of
the benefit they receive from the property tax exemptions on to their tenants. Tenants'
Property Tax Rebate Act, ch. 63, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 222 (West) (to be codified as
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54: 4-6.2 to 4-6.13).
136. State Expenditures Limitation Act, ch. 67, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 226 (West)
(to be codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52: 9H-5 to 9H-11). The expenditure limit is
computed by multiplying the appropriation of the state in the base year (1976-77 fiscal
year) by the state per capita personal income in the base year. The limit applies to all
appropriations except state aid anticipated in local budgets, federal funds, and payments
of interest or principal on general obligation bonds. Another provision limits increases in
spending by municipalities and counties to 5%. Local Governments-Limitations on
Expenditures, ch. 68, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 229 (West) (to be codified as N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40A: 4-45.1 to 4-45.6).
137. As part of the tax scheme the Unincorporated Business Tax (Unincorporated
Business Tax Act-Repeal, ch. 80, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 252 (West) (repealing N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54: 1lB-1 to I1 B-23)) and the Retail Gross Receipts Tax (Retail Gross
Receipts Tax Act-Repeal, ch. 81, 1976 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 253 (West) (repealing N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54: 1 IC-1 to IIC-14)) were repealed.
138. Even though the Robinson I decision was based on the state's education clause,
the court requested all parties to brief the equal protection question in Robinson V.
Notice to Parties and Amici, Supreme Court of New Jersey, Oct. 21, 1975. The Attorney
General argued that the 1975 Act was
consistent with the equal protection guarantees of the New Jersey Constitution,
because there is a rational basis for the legislative determination to delegate primary
responsibility for public education. . .to local school districts, and the legislature
properly may provide a formula of state aid. . . which does not simply seek to
equalize the local fiscal burden.
Brief for Defendant-Attorney General at 40, Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69 N.J.
449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976).
139. "It is, initially, of vital importance to note that this is the first time in the course
of this litigation that we have had an opportunity to consider a plan intended to meet all
aspects of a thorough and efficient education." 69 N.J. at 455-57, 335 A.2d at 132.
140. Id. at 458-62, 355 A.2d at 134-35.
141. Id. at 463-64, 355 A.2d at 136.
1977]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
but would be a dynamic plan for the improvement of New Jersey's
public school system. 142
The actual reform approved in Robinson V fails to provide the
equality mandated by Robinson 11 43 The Robinson I court had found
the Bateman Act unconstitutional because it failed to provide suffi-
cient financing for a "thorough and efficient" education (education
clause) rather than because it failed to provide equal financial re-
sources to all districts (equal protection clause). 144 The Robinson litiga-
tion can thus be distinguished from Serrano.
The Supreme Court of California, in Serrano II, held that the
California school finance system violated the state's equal protection
clause rather than its education clause.145 The court found that only a
fiscally neutral system could meet the requirements of the state's equal
protection clause." Defendants in Serrano II suggested an optimum
balance criteria rather than fiscal neutrality.' 47 Defendants' optimum
balancing approach is much closer to the Robinson approach and
illustrates a distinction between Robinson and Serrano. Defendants in
Serrano II were proposing that the court accept a high base program
with minimum local augmentation. The New Jersey court approved the
1975 Act because it provided a thorough and efficient education for
New Jersey students by raising the minimum state support level. The
New Jersey system is thus also a high base program with local augmen-
tation. The California court rejected the optimum balance criteria,
professing to accept only pure equality measured against fiscal
neutrality.' 8
Under California's equal protection approach in Serrano II it is
possible that a school finance system could be approved even though it
142. Id. at 464-65, 355 A.2d at 137.
143. 62 N.J. at 513-14, 303 A.2d at 294. See Tractenberg, Robinson v. Cahill: The
Thorough and Efficient Clause, supra note 2, at 522.
144. 69 N.J. at 464, 355 A.2d at 136: "The fiscal provisions of the Act are to be
judged as adequate or inadequate depending upon whether they do or do not afford
sufficient financial support for the system of public education that will emerge from the
implementation of the plan set forth in the statute."
145. - Cal. 3d at -, 557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
146. Id. at -, 557 P.2d at 953, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
147. Under the balancing approach, some variation in resources among districts
would be tolerated to accomodate the need for local control of fiscal and educational
matters. Defendants suggested that so long as the state school finance system allowed no
more than 10% of the total state revenues to be "unequalized" (dependent on district
welath) it met the requirements of equality. Id. at -, 557 P.2d at 944, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
360.
148. Id. at -, 557 P.2d at 944-45, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61.
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does not provide a "thorough and efficient" education. 149 From a
practical standpoint, however, it may be easier to persuade the Califor-
nia legislature to increase state aid to a level of minimum sufficiency
when all districts, rich and poor, are spending at the same rate and thus
united in their demands. Under the Robinson V education clause
approach, persuading the legislature to include aid to property-poor
districts to achieve equality of educational resources may be more
difficult since such districts are providing a "sufficient" education and
are alone in their demand for increased resources.
The equal protection approach also raises the problem of implicating
other municipal services. 150 The New Jersey supreme court avoided
such a problem by basing its decision on the education clause. The
Serrano I court found education to be unique among public services
and expressly refused to consider the problem of extending its equal
protection holding beyond education. 5 1 The Serrano IT court did not
reconsider the problem.
IV. IMPLIMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCE SYSTEMS
It is obvious that a declaration of unconstitutionality is only the first
step toward meaningful school finance reform. Alternative school
finance systems must be implemented. The Serrano trial court
suggested that a district power equalizing formula (DPE) would satisfy
the equal protection requirements. 152 Under a pure DPE plan,'53 each
school district chooses its own tax rate. The financial resources the
149. Id. at - n.28, 557 P.2d at 943 n.28, 135 Cal. rptr. at 359 n.28, quoting the trial
court's memorandum opinion:
What the Serrano court imposed as a California constitutional requrement is that
there must be uniformity of treatment between the children of the various school
districts in the State because all the children of the State in public schools are
persons similarly circumscribed. The equal-protection-of-the-laws provisions of the
California Constitution mandate nothing less than that all such persons shall be
treated alike. If such uniformity of treatment were to result in all children being
provided a low-quality educational program, even a clearly inadequate educational
program. the California Constitution would be satisifed. The court does not read
the Sewrrano funds for each child in the State at some magic level to produce either
an adequate-quality educatonal program or a high-quality educatnal program. It is
only a dispartiy in treatment between equals which runs afoul of the California
consitutional mandate of equal protection of the laws.
150. Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court's Responsibilities, and Opportunities in
the Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 720, 726-28 (1972).
See notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
151. 5 Cal. 3d at 614, 487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
152. - Cal. 3d at -, 557 P.2d at 938, 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 354, 355.
153. District power equalization was first proposed by COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN,
supra note 3, at 201-42.
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district is entitled to are established by a support/effort schedule. 5 4
The quality of education provided by the district is thus determined by
its chosen tax rate rather than its property wealth. 55 The plan is
designed to achieve fiscal neutrality 156 while maintaining some local
control over the administration and financing of public schools.
57
Recapture is an essential element to equalization under DPE
programs. 5 s
The many policy considerations involved in selecting a DPE plan, 59
154. Barro, supra note I1, at 54-59. The following table illustrates a hpothetical DPE
plan.
State aid per pupil when district
Support assessed value per pupil is:
Tax Rate per pupil $6000 $12,000 $18,000 $24,000 $30,000
2.0% (min) $ 600 $480 $360 $240 $ 120 $ 0
2.5 700 550 400 250 100 -50
3.0 800 620 440 260 80 -100
3.5 900 690 480 270 60 -150
4.0 1000 760 520 280 40 -200
4.5 1075 805 535 265 -5 -275
5.0 1150 850 550 250 -50 -350
5.5 1225 895 565 235 -95 -425
6.0 (max) 1300 940 580 220 -140 -500
Id. at 57.
155. Theoretically, the choice a local district makes under a DPE plan will be a
function of both the increase in the base level of state aid over the existing system and
the slope of the support-versus-effort schedule. Id. at 68-74. A district will probably not
lower its tax rate even though it can receive the same resources at a lower rate; if the
slope is attractive enough, the district may in fact increase its tax rate to purchase
additional educational resources at the bargain rate. Id. Thus, DPE may not only
maintain local control over the choice of a tax rate but may also destroy the "cruel
illusion" of local control in property-poor districts by selling educational resources at a
lower price. But see Citizens Union Comm. on Educ. Finance, Financing Pu blic Educa-
tion in New York State: An Analysis of the Fleishmann Commission Report, 48
N.Y.U.L. REv. 6, 14 (1973) (DPE will result in greater disparities in educational re-
sources since poorer districts will find it more difficult to tax at a high rate and since the
system will still be based on the regressive property tax).
District power equalization has been attacked because it does make educational
spending dependent on the voters' chosen tax rate. Educational spending should be
based on educational considerations rather than tax considerations. Silard & Goldstein,
supra note 2, at 321-22.
156. See Carrington, supra note 3: "The great charm of the 'no wealth' principle is
evident. It can be simply stated. It is easy to apply. It does not require the courts to
appraise the sufficiency of any funding levels. It seems to leave much freedom to design
new systems of school finance. And it is faithful to the rhetoric of equal educational
opportunity." Id. at 1231.
157. Barro, supra note 11, at 49. See Silard & Goldstein, supra note 2, at 377.
158. Barro, supra note 11, at 49.
159. Policy decisions must be made regarding the base level program, the funding
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however, may allow state legislatures to make political compromises
diluting the equalizing effect of the plan."W The New Jersey plan
approved in Robinson V, while not a pure power equalizing system, 161
exemplifies the tendency to dilute equalization aid. In providing
minimum 162 and categorical aid 63 to all districts, including a save-
harmless clause' 64 to protect wealth districts, and allowing local aug-
mentation, 65 the New Jersey legislature eliminated much of the
equalizing effect promised by its guaranteed assessed valuation
program.
Serrano II may encourage the state legislature to adopt a district
power equalization plan, though the trial court suggested other alterna-
tives. 16 The California Constitution allows for variation in school
district expenditures. 67 Responding to the argument that the California
Constitution specifically authorizes those elements of the California
school finance system that create the inequalities among districts, the
needed to support a minimum adequate education, including adjustments for need and
cost differences among districts, and the slope of the supplementation line. Barro, supra
note 11, at 58. The New Jersey program is not a pure incentive equalization plan. It
establishes a base level of aid through a guaranteed property valuation scheme and
allows each district to augment that aid as it wishes. The plan does not provide any
incentive to local districts since it does not match their augmentation with state funds.
Under a pure incentive equalization plan, the state can make supplementation more
attractive by reducing the effective price of education with a high support/effort.ratio.
Id. at 59. In the alternative, a state can place an upper limit on taxing or spending or
establish a high base program with limited supplementation to reduce the disparities in
actual expenditures which are possible under DPE plans. Id. at 55.
160. Silard & Goldstein, supra note 2, at 317, 319. See Tractenberg, supra note 3, at
428 n.302 ("Legislative unwillingness to appropriate sufficient funds, political deference
to educational home rule, and the need to pacify suburban interests by increasing state
aid to their districts, have diminished the actual impact of the most progressive-sounding
programs.") See also Grubb, supra note 6, at 465.
161. The New Jersey school finance system remains a foundation program. Power
equalizing requires that the state aid for each district be based upon the district's chosen
tax rate. The New Jersey plan provides equalization aid based on a guaranteed assessed
valuation scheme rather than the districts' chosen tax rate. The New Jersey system,
however, does illustrate the problem of legislative compromise when numerous policy
parameters are involved.
162. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 7A-18(c) (West Supp. 1976).
163. Id. § 18A: 7A-20, 7A-34, 7A-35.
164. Id. § 18A: 7A-49, 7A-50.
165. Id. § 18A-7A-18.
166. - Cal. 3d at -, 557 P.2d at 938-39, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 354-55. The trial court
suggested that full state funding, consolidation of the 1,067 school districts into about
500 districts with boundary realignments to equalize property values, statewide taxation
of commercial and industrial property, district power equalizing, and vouchers might all
be "workable, practical and feasible" alternative methods of school financing. Id.
167. Id. at -, 557 P.2d at 954, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
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Serrano II court decided that the constitution does not authorize
inequalities based on district wealth but did not contest the fact that the
constitution does allow for local variations. 16 If the state constitution
authorizes local variation among districts, it will be difficult to per-
suade the legislature to adopt any plan other than one which allows for
local variation. DPE is the only proposal that promises both fiscal
neutrality and local variation.
Other states that have reformed their school finance systems by
enacting power equalizing plans have diluted much of the promised
neutrality, and thus the possibility of equality, through manipulation of
the various policy judgments involved. 69 As the New Jersey experi-
ence indicates, it may be difficult for the California court to avoid
approving such a compromise plan. Robinson I declared that the New
Jersey school finance system violated the state education clause, but
provided the court with an opportunity to interpret that clause to
require equality. 170 The New Jersey court first redistributed state ap-
propriated funds 71 and later closed the New Jersey public schools 172 in
an attempt to enforce its Robinson I decision. The financing system
approved in Robinson V suggests that the New Jersey court itself
became involved in the compromise process.
Full state funding offers an alternative that would avoid many of the
problems associated with implementing DPE plans. It would meet the
New Jersey court's sufficiency test, 173 the California court's fiscal
168. Id. The court was considering CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 21 which provides that
"the legislature shall provide for an annual levy by county governing bodies of school
district taxes sufficient to produce annual revenues for each district that the district's
board determines are required for its schools and district functions."
169. See Grubb, supra note 6, at 490-91.
170. See 62 N.J. at 513-14, 303 A.2d at 294.
171. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
172. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson VI), 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976). The court
later dissolved the injunction after the enactment of a state income tax which permitted
full funding of the Public School Education Act of 1975. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson
VII) 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
173. Tractenberg, supra note 3, at 437. The original 1871 Sta School Tax Act, the
Free School Law, ch. 527, §§ 1, 4, 5, [1871] N.J. Laws 94, provided essentially for full
state funding based on a statewide property tax with local augmentation. Tractenberg,
supra note 3, at 438-39.
The Fleishmann Commission recommended that New York adopt a full state funding
plan to be implemented at the 65th percentile level. FLEISCHMANN REPORT supra note 5,
at 65. A firmly established spending level similar to the Fleischmann recommendation
would have provided the New Jersey Supreme Court with a concrete basis for deciding
whether the state legislature had met its obligation to provide a "thorough and efficient"
education. The finance program actually adopted by the New Jersey legislature leaves
the determination of which districts are providing a thorough and efficient education to
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neutrality test, 74 and at the same time achieve the absolute equality of
resources originally sought. In 1970 the Governor of New Jersey
established a committee (The Sears Commission) to examine the tax
policies of New Jersey including those policies relevant to the financ-
ing of New Jersey's public school systems. 175 The Sears Commission
recommended that the State assume the primary responsibility for
financing public school systems. 176 The funds were to be raised from a
mix of statewide property taxes, income taxes, and an increase in the
sales tax,177 and were to be distributed equally to all districts based on
the educational costs per pupil in each district as determined by the
Commissioner of Education. 178
Full state funding has also been recommended as the most appro-
priate solution to New York's school finance problems. 179 The Fleish-
mann Commission recommended that educational resources be raised
through a statewide property tax180 and distributed to all districts
equally 18' but also recommended that all educational spending be
equalized at the sixty-fifth percentile 182 with a save-harmless provision
to protect wealthy districts spending above that level. 83
The primary advantage of power equalization is that it retains local
control over the administration and financing of public schools."g The,
Sears Commission suggested several advantages to full state funding to
the Commissioner of Education since educational resources will vary among districts
depending upon the district's taxable property. See Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 69
N.J. 449, 458, 355 A.2d 129, 134 (1976).
174. See Michelson, What is a Just System for Financing Schools? An Evaluation of
Alternative Reforms, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 436, 458 (1974) ("a shift to state funding
and equal allocation automatically generates compliance with court orders to disas-
sociate school spending from district wealth.").
175. Ruvoldt, supra note 3, at 23.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 24.
178. Id. at 23-24. The Commission's plan allowed some leeway in local district
spending to be funded through local property taxes based on a type of incentive
equalization plan under which the state would contribute a portion of the leeway based
on the district's wealth. Id. at 24.
179. FLEISCHMANN REPORT, supra note 5, at 55.
180. Id. at 74.
181. Id. at 63-73.
182. Id. at 63-64. But see Citizens Union Comm. on Educ. Finance, supra note 154
(arguing that the most significant disparities occur above the 65th percentile and that
those districts needing more educational money, the big cities, will not benefit from the
65th percentile level).
183. FLEISCHMANN REPORT, supra note 5, at 65.
184. Barro, supra note 11, at 49.
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counter the local control argument,"8 5 while the Fleishmann Commis-
sion argued that local control over school administration can be sepa-
rated from local control over school finance. 186 A full state funding
system may sacrifice local control over the financing of public schools,
but the inequality in educational resources caused by traditional school
finance systems is too high a price to pay for that control. 187 Full state
funding leaves less room for legislative manipulation'88 and thus has
the potential for providing greater equality in school finance.
185. The Sears Commission argued that full state funding would eliminate competi-
tion among districts, reduce ratables zoning, support state housing policies, balance the
use of property and non-property taxes, eliminate tax shelters, assure adequate re-
sources in all districts, encourage a balance of population between urban areas and their
suburbs, and equalize educational opportunity among all districts. Ruvoldt, supra note
3, at 25.
186. FLEISCHMANN REPORT, supra note 5, at 86. The Commission suggested that
administrative control should be at the school rather than district level. Id. But see San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1973) ("[the people
of Texas] may believe that along with increased control of the purse strings at the state
level will go increased control over local policies."). See also Silard & Goldstein, supra
note 2, at 332-33 (analogizing to Great Britain and New Brunswick, Canada, where such
a separation between control over financing and administration is maintained).
187. In addition to inequality in educational resources, financing systems based on
local funding may have other social and economic consequences including racial isola-
tion. Silard & Goldstein, supra note 2, at 309-10. School finance inequalities may have
contributed to "white-flight" to suburban school districts and (in the pattern of a vicious
circle) increased the financial disparities between cities and suburbs by drawing valuable
industry to the suburbs. The problem perpetuates itself as urban school systems become
more segregated and financially burdened. Id. 322-26.
188. There are two policy parameters involved in implementing a full state funding
proposal. First, the level of the base program must be set. Second, adjustments must be
made in the funding level for differing needs and costs among districts. Barro, supra
note 11, at 51-54.
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